This online appendix provides detailed proofs and illustrations that are omitted in the paper. Part I of this appendix contains a detailed proof of Proposition 3 in Section 4.3.1 for -Cursed equilibrium. Part II provides a detailed analysis of applying a Level-k reasoning in the average bid auction. Part III of this appendix illustrates how we conducted our monte carlo simulations to generate an approximate best response in Figure 2 . And detailed graphs of individual bid functions in our experiments can be found in Part IV.
Part I. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3. The argument for there being no -Cursed equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies for all 2 [0; 1] is essentially identical to that in Proposition 1. We hence omit the proof of this part for brevity.
To establish that a result similar to our Proposition 2 holds for the case n = 3, …rst note that if there were a strictly increasing -Cursed Equilibrium, then a bidder with signal s would receive the following payo¤ from bidding b E (CjS = s) is the interim "best estimate"of the unknown cost c for a bidder with signal s. This expression resonates with our claim in the paper that in the interim stage (upon receiving signal s), types in the two end regions have more information about the underlying true cost compared to types in the middle region. We now prove the second part of Proposition 3, which will be in close parallel with that of Proposition 2. To simplify the argument, we shall consider only the case of fully-cursed bidders (i.e., = 1). As we shall see from the sequel, a combination of the case of = 1 and the previous case of = 0 (Proposition 2) implies that the second part of Proposition 3 holds for all 2 [0; 1].
Step 1. There is no fully-cursed equilibrium where the increasing bidding function b (s) has vertical jumps. This is similar to that in Proposition 2: If there were such a gap, then the type sitting right at the gap would bid at the upper end of the gap, which does not a¤ect the type's expected winning probability, and at the same time strictly increases the type's payo¤ in the event of winning.
Step 2. There cannot be a monotone equilibrium that is partially pooling and partially separating. As in Proposition 2, all types in a neighborhood around C H + will bid the same amount z C H . We now show that all types in [C L ; C H + ] bid also z in a fully-cursed equilibrium. First consider the case where s 2 [C H ; C H + ] and suppose that in a fullycursed equilibrium with b (s), 9s 2 [C H ; C H + ] such that b (s 0 ) is strictly increasing for s 0 < s and b (s) = b (s 00 ) for all s 00 2 [s; C H + ]. Notice that C H + s > 0 by our assumption that all types in a neighborhood around C H + with positive measure bid z. Type s's equilibrium payo¤ by bidding b (s) = z C H is
while if type s bids b 0 (s) = z " for some arbitrarily small " > 0, we have (again, omit arbitrarily small quantities in obtaining the approximation):
Using the fact that C H + s , z C H , and s C H , we have
;
implying that type s (and also all types in a small neighborhood to the right of s) has strict incentives to deviate downward slightly. A contradiction. Similar arguments can be applied to cases where s 2 [C L + ; C H ] and s 2 [C L ; C L + ]. We conclude that the only type of symmetric increasing fully-cursed equilibria is that all types bid an identical amount.
Step 3. The …nal step is to show that all types bidding an identical amount z C H is indeed a fully-cursed equilibrium. The argument is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 2.
Part II. Detailed Analysis for Level-k Reasoning
Our analysis here anchors on the speci…cation that a level-0 bidder ignores her signal and submits a bid that is uniformly distributed in [C L ; M ] with C L < M C H . Here, we only present the derivation of b 1 (s) in expression (4) in Section 4.3.1 for the case of s 2 [C L ; C L + ] and n = 3. We can apply the following analysis, mutatis mutandis, to the other two signal regions.
A level-1 bidder's expected payo¤ from bidding b (s), when facing two level-0 bidders, is
It can be veri…ed (using …rst-order and second-order conditions) that a level-1 bidder with signal s 2 [C L ; C L + ] will optimally bid (given a su¢ ciently large M ):
Notice that whether the optimal bidding function b 1 (s) is (strictly) increasing in s depends on the magnitude of M; C L and . Next consider the optimal level-2 bidding behavior (call it b 2 (s)) given b 1 (s). A complete analysis of b 2 (s) is di¢ cult, if not impossible. The …rst di¢ culty is that monotonicity of b 1 (s) is not guaranteed without fully specifying the parameters (M; C L ; C H and ). Second, even with a speci…c parameter constellation that guarantees the monotonicity of b 1 (s), it is di¢ cult to analytically derive the optimal bidding function b 2 (s). To see this, consider the case where s 2 [C L ; C L + ] and b 1 (s) is strictly increasing. A level-2 bidder's expected payo¤ from bidding b (s) can be explicitly written as:
(2 ) 2 dc:
Given the non-linear structure of the function b 1 (s) in (1), it is technically di¢ cult to derive an optimal bidding function for 2 (b (s) ; s). To nevertheless obtain an illustration of b 2 (s), as well as a comparison between b 1 (s) and b 2 (s), we use simulation to obtain a numerical solution of b 2 (s), which is demonstrated in Figure 1 . Part III. An Illustration of the Monte Carlo Simulation for Figure 2 We use monte carlo simulations to select the numerical best response of bidder 1, given that all the other four bidders are bidding according to b (s) = 0:918s + 145:38. 2 Essentially, we adopt a brute-force search algorithm to …nd the best response. The basic idea of our algorithm is illustrated as follows:
Step 1. Specify the (discretized) sets of all possible bids for bidder 1 and all possible cost realizations given each possible signal of bidder 1: 3 Given the bidding behavior in b (s), generate the set of all possible bids of bidder 1 as
For each possible signal of bidder 1, denoted as s 1 2 [C L ; C H + ], generate a …eld of cost realizations F c (s 1 ) = [minfC L ; s 1 g; maxfs 1 + ; C H g] with jF c (s 1 )j = m.
For each signal s 1 , we determine the optimal bid of bidder 1 b 1 (s 1 ) in Step 2 and Step 3. First, set index k = 1 and 1 (b 1 ; s 1 ) = 0.
Step 2. Given s 1 , randomly draw a cost c 2 F c (s 1 ) with equal probability. For each realization of c, generate random signals s j , j 2 f2; : : : ; 5g, uniformly from [c ; c + ], which in turn determine the bids of the other bidders according to b (s j ). Given a bid b 1 2 B 1 , calculate
where I ( ) is the indicator function. Set
If k = m, return 1 (b 1 ; s 1 ) and stop (the resulting 1 (b 1 ; s 1 ) is the desired numerical expected payo¤ from bidding b 1 ). Otherwise, let k = k + 1 and go to Step 2.
Step 3. We run Step 2 for each possible bid b 1 2 B 1 . The optimal bid of bidder 1 with signal s 1 is then determined as 
Part IV. Plots of Individual Bidders'Behavior

Part V. Instructions Lowest Bid Auction Verbal Instruction Script
Thank you for participating in today's experiment. I will read through a script to explain to you the nature of today's experiment as well as how to navigate the computer interface with which you will be working. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. This is an experiment in decision-making. In addition to a $10 participation fee, you will have the opportunity to earn more through the course of the experiment and you will be paid your earnings and the participation fee privately by a check at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for one of us to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Also, please turn all cell phones o¤ or on mute for the duration of the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment with only the show-up fee.
All monetary amounts you will see in this experiment are denominated ECUs or Experimental Currency Units. Your earnings for this session will equal to the sum of your earnings for each round and at the end of the experiment you will be paid your earnings with a check. Your earnings in ECU's will translate into dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU or 100 ECUs=$1. So if you earn 500 ECU's, you earn $5, 1000 ECU's $10, 2000 ECU's $20 and so forth. This is in addition to the $10 participation fee you will receive regardless of what happens over the course of the experiment.
In today's experiment, you will participate in a series of auctions. In each auction round, you and 4 other subjects will participate in an auction where you will be in the role of sellers attempting to sell a single hypothetical item to a computerized buyer. In every round the cost to a seller of providing the item to the buyer will be common across all sellers but the exact value will be unknown before the transaction is complete. The earnings to the winner of an auction will be equal to the sale price less the true cost of the item. The details on how this works will be explained below.
The true cost for selling an item will be chosen at the beginning of each round and will be drawn from a uniform distribution on the range [150, 1500] . This means that the chances of the true cost in each round being any number between 150 and 1500 are equally likely. So it is exactly as likely the true cost is 230 as it is as 1100. You will, however, not be informed of exactly what that true cost is. Instead you will receive a signal about that cost. Speci…cally if the true cost in some round is equal to V, you will receive a signal equal to V+e where the value of e will be chosen separately for each bidder from a uniform distribution on the range [-200, 200] . For example, if the true cost is 700 in a particular round and you will receive a cost signal between 500 and 900 with equal probability. The important thing to remember is that the signal you receive is unlikely to be the actual cost. The true cost could be higher or lower than the signal you receive. While you won't know exactly what the true cost is, as we will show you later, you can be sure it is within the range of 200 above or below your signal.
While the range of true costs is between 150 and 1500, it is possible for you to receive a signal that is outside of these bounds. If, for example, you receive a signal of 100, the actual potential range of the true cost will be between 150 and 300 since it cannot be lower than 150.
It is also important to realize that while the true cost will be the same for any seller in an auction, the signal about the cost that each seller receives will likely be di¤erent.
At the beginning of a round you will be told your signal about the cost of selling in that round and will be asked to place a bid simultaneously with the others you are competing against.
After the bids are submitted, the winner will be the seller who submitted the lowest bid and they will be paid a price equal to their bid. The winner's pro…t will be equal to the di¤erence between that price and the true cost, not the di¤erence between the price and the signal about that cost.
START SOFTWARE
Please turn to your computers now so that we can lead you through a demo of the experiment software. The screen may have gone dark and if so, just move the mouse and it will wake up. What you see in front of you is an example of how the cost draws work to help explain to you the relationship between the signals you will receive and the true cost in any given round. On the top of screen, you see a diagram which indicates the range of signal you might receive if the true cost in a round were to be 800. The lowest possible signal you, or anyone else, could receive in this round is 600 and the maximum possible signal would be 1000. Your cost signal can be any number between 600 and 1000 with equal chances.
(Subjects now see this screenshot on the computer) Below this we provide 5 examples of what might be seen by participants in an auction round. In this case, each participant received a di¤erent signal from the common range of 600-1000 and the speci…c signals received are 781, 753, 833, 876, and 993. The diagrams next to the signals show you the range of what the true cost could be given that signal. Assume for the moment that in this round you are in the position of subject 1. The information you would be given is the signal about the true cost of 781. Since your signal has to be within 200 above or below the true cost, this signal guarantees you that the lowest possible value of the true cost is 581 and the highest possible true cost is 981. This range is indicated in the diagram next to the signal.
The other 4 participants in the auction that round will have received di¤erent signals and so will have di¤erent estimates of the true cost. You will notice that while the range each participant will have for the true cost is di¤erent, each of those ranges includes 800 which is the true cost for this round.
After seeing your signal about the cost in a round, you will need to place a bid. Next to the diagrams are three sets of sample bids that each of these individuals might submit. You will notice that in case 1 the bids in this example range from 750 up to 1103, and the …rst bidder wins with the lowest bid at 750 but since this bid is below the true cost of 800, this results in a loss of 50 for the round. In the second example the …rst bidder has bid 810 and still wins but this time has made a pro…t of 10 since the price is now above the cost. In the …nal case, subject 2 wins and also makes a pro…t.
Please click the "Continue" button.
(Subjects now see this screenshot on the computer)
We will now take you through a few practice rounds based on those same examples using the interface you will use in the experiment. During these practice rounds you will participate in the auction with 4 robot competitors. During the actual experiment you will compete with four other subjects. In the section of your screen on the left you will see a short summary of the rules. These rule summaries will be present all the way through the experiment to remind you how the auctions will work.
On the top right of your screen you see a cost diagram. This diagram is the same as the ones you saw on that …rst screen and it shows you the range of where the true cost might be given the signal that you have received. The black line indicates the overall range for the true cost, 150-1500. You have all received for this practice round the same signal of 781, but as I explained earlier, during the real rounds, signals will be drawn independently and typically everyone would have a di¤erent signal as you saw on the previous screen. You'll note that this is the midpoint of a red section along that black line. This red section indicates the possible values of the true cost which are consistent with your signal of 781. Again, while this does not tell you the exact value of the true cost, you do know that at a minimum it is 581 and at a maximum it is 981. The information about the signal cost and the potential span of the true cost is also provided below the diagram.
Directly below this information you will …nd a text box labeled "Please enter your bid" which allows you to enter your bid. Below this is a red button marked "Submit." To place a bid you enter a bid in the "your bid"box and press this button. Please type "750"in for your bid and press the "Submit" button now.
Once you and all the others have placed your bids, the right side of your screen will update showing you the outcome of the auction for this round. You will be told if you won the auction or not and you will be informed of the true cost for the round. In this case your bid of 750 is the lowest bid among all of the bidders. We set it up so that you won the auction to show you how earnings work. Below the outcome of the auction, you will see the sale price, which equals your bid, 750. Directly below is your earnings report. The amount paid to you is equal to the sale price, which is 750. The true cost is shown in brown in the cost diagram at the top, which is 800. In this case your earnings for this period are 750-800=-50 indicating that you lost money for the round.
(Subjects now see this screenshot on the computer) Please click "Continue".
For this period, everyone again has been given a common signal of 781. Please type "810" in the box and press the "Submit" button now.
(Subjects now see this screenshot on the computer) Again, the true cost was 800. Your bid of 810 was the lowest bid meaning you won. Your earnings are 810-800=10.
Please click "Continue".
Please type "925" in the box and press the "Submit" button now. This shows you the Final case in which you lose the auction. The lowest bid was 821. Since you have lost the auction, your earnings for the round are 0.
(Subjects now see this screenshot on the computer) You will now be able to participate in 2 more unscripted practice rounds playing against robot bidders to let you see how the interface works. In these rounds you may bid what you like. Click on "Continue" button to start a new practice auction.
Reminder
Please note that the examples we have gone through are just examples and should not be taken as indications of how to bid. Further in the practice rounds you were bidding against robots while in the real rounds you will bid against other people in the room who may bid di¤erently from the robots. The purpose of the practice rounds was to show you how the rules of the auction worked.
There will be a total of 30 rounds in this experiment. Just as in the practice rounds, your signal will change from round to round and those of your opponents will as well. The true cost of selling will also change from round to round but again, this will be common among you and your competitors in a given round. The identity of your opponents will change from round to round as you will be re-matched against other bidders with each new round. You will never be told who in the room you are bidding against but the participants you are competing against will change from round to round.
As you have seen, it is possible for you to lose money in an auction round. If you sell at a price that is lower than the true cost of selling in that round, then your earnings will be negative. To account for this possibility, everyone will start with an initial balance of 1000 ECUs. Each round this balance will rise as you make money and fall if you have rounds with negative earnings. If you lose so much money that your overall balance goes below 0, you will be declared bankrupt. The …rst time this happens to you, we will re-initialize you, starting you over with a new positive initial balance of 500 ECUs. If your earnings balance goes negative a second time, however, you will be asked to leave the experiment with only your $10.00 participation fee. To insure that the experiment can continue in this case we have recruited an additional subject to serve in the role of an alternate who will replace someone should they go bankrupt twice. The alternate will be paid an amount equal to the average earnings of others for rounds in which he or she is not active and will otherwise receive earnings and be subject to the same rules as anyone else should they become active bidders.
Are there any questions about how these procedures will work?
The experiment will begin soon. We again ask that you do not talk with other participants or look at their screens during the experiment. Anyone who violates the rules may be asked to leave the experiment with only the $10.00 participation fee.
Minimum Average Bid Auction Verbal Instruction Script
All monetary amounts you will see in this experiment are denominated ECUs or Experimental Currency Units. Your earnings for this session will be equal to the sum of your earnings for each round and at the end of the experiment you will be paid your earnings with a check. Your earnings in ECU's will translate into dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU or 100 ECUs=$1. So if you earn 500 ECU's, you earn $5, 1000 ECU's $10, 2000 ECU's $20 and so forth. This is in addition to the $10 participation fee you will receive regardless of what happens over the course of the experiment.
After the bids are submitted, the winner will be the seller who submitted the bid closest to the average of the bids placed by all bidders and they will be paid a price equal to their bid. The winner's pro…t will be equal to the di¤erence between that price and the true cost, not the di¤erence between the price and the signal about that cost.
START SOFTWARE
After seeing your signal about the cost in a round, you will need to place a bid. Next to the diagrams are three sets of sample bids that each of these individuals might submit. The average bid of all bidders for each case is shown in the bottom row of sample bids colored in light blue. You will notice that in case 1 the bids in this example range from 544 up to 1200 with the average, 821, being indicated below. The …rst bidder wins with a bid of 794 which is closest to the average bid of 821. Since this bid is below the true cost of 800, this results in a loss of 6 for the round. In the second example the …rst bidder has bid 810 and still wins but this time has made a pro…t of 10 since the price is now above the cost. In the …nal case, subject 4 wins and also makes a pro…t.
Directly below this information you will …nd a text box labeled "Please enter your bid" which allows you to enter your bid. Below this is a red button marked "Submit." To place a bid you enter a bid in the "your bid"box and press this button. Please type "794"in for your bid and press the "Submit" button now.
Once you and all the others have placed your bids, the right side of your screen will update showing you the outcome of the auction for this round. You will be told if you won the auction or not and you will be informed of the true cost for the round. In this case your bid is the closest bid to the average bid of 821. We set it up so that you won the auction to show you how earnings work. Below the outcome of the auction, you will see the sale price, which equals your bid, 794. Directly below is your earnings report. The amount paid to you is equal to the sale price, which is 794. The true cost is shown in brown in the cost diagram at the top, which is 800. In this case your earnings for this period are 794-800= -6 indicating you lost money for the round.
Reminder
